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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

ROY J. TIPPETTS,

Case No. 15512

Defendant-Appellant.
,I

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is the reply brief of the appellant in his appeal
from a conviction of Robbery, a Felony of the Second Degree, in
the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, State

of Utah, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, presiding.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of guilt entered
against him and a new trial.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT NEVER WAIVED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO CONFLICT-FREE, SEPARATE COUNSEL.
Appellant submits that respondent misconstrues the law on
waiver of a constitutional right.

It is well settled that an accused

may waive his right to protections guaranteed by the Constitution.
Thus, although a conflict of interest may indeed violate an accused's
right to effective assistance of counsel, that right may be waived.
However, it bears repeating that the trial court bears a significant
responsibility for ensuring that fundamental rights are relinquished
voluntarily and intelligently and only after an accused has an
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of
such a waiver.

1

Thus, in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,

71 (1942), the Supreme Court stated that "we indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of a fundamental right."
In the case at bar, notwithstanding the fact that the
appellant was not present when the decision was made that Esplin
would represent both the appellant and his co-defendant (R. 1-4), the
State concludes in its brief that this Court should infer that he
did nonetheless waive his right to conflict-free, separate counsel.

1.

See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
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for example, in Point I of respondent's brief it is stated, "Clearly
defendant Lopez was informed of his right to continue the trial
(T. 1-4) and it can be inferred that Esplin, appellant's original
sole counsel, fully explained the situation to appellant before the
pre-trial conference."

(Respondent's brief at 14-15; Emphasis supplied).

This same reasoning is echoed throughout respondent's brief.

Another

striking example is found in Point IV of respondent's brief, where
respondent states, "After carefully considering the matter, Lopez,
Esplin, the trial judge, and appellant -- through the proxy representation of Esplin acting in his behalf -- all agreed that there would
be no conflict problem."

(Respondent's brief at 28; Emphasis supplied).

In Point III respondent also cites authority for the proposition that
the appellant's silence can be construed as a waiver.

Coates v.

Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414 (1942).
Appellant submits that the respondent's proxy and silence
theories of waiver are dramatically opposed to the decisional law
which has evolved in the area of the waiver of a constitutional right.

In Carnley v. Cochran, 396 U.S. 506 (1962), the United States Supreme
Court laid to rest the notion that waiver of a fundamental right
could be inferred from a silent record.

The Cornley court held that:

Presuming waiver of the right to counsel from a
silent record is impermissible. The record must
show, or there must be an allegation and evidence
which show, that an accused was offered counsel
but intelligently and understandingly rejected
the offer. Anything less is not waiver. 396
U.S. at 516. (Emphasis Supplied)
Similarly, in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), where the
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Court held that an accused has a Sixth Amendment right to waive
counsel altogether, the Court insisted that before an accused
could forego the guiding hand of counsel, he must fully understand
the benefits he is relinquishing:
Although a defendant need not himself have the
skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers of
self-representation, so that the record will
establish that "he knows what he is doin and his
choice is made with eyes open.
citations omitted]
422 U.S. at 835. (Emphasis Supplied)
In the instant matter, the record is barren of any indication that
the appellant was admonished by either the trial court or his trial
counsel about the possible ramifications of multiple representation.
At least one court has found a valid waiver where an
attorney represented to the court that he had discussed the possibilitj
of a conflict of interest with the defendant and the defendant
agreed that no conflict was present.

In United States v. Armone,

363 F.2d 385, 406 (2nd Circuit 1966), the defendant challenged his
conviction on the basis that a conflict of interest prevented him
from receiving a fair trial.

There the possibility of a conflict

was probed at a pre-trial hearing.

In rejecting the defendant's

conflict claim, the Second Circuit pointed to the fact that the
record revealed that the defendant was present when his attorney
represented to the trial court that he had fully discussed the matter
with the defendant and that he consented to the dual representatioo.
Comparing Armone to the case at bar, it is readily apparent that
none of the circumstances of the defendant's informed consent in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~are

present in the instant matter.

Mr. Esplin never made

any such representations to the trial court and the appellant was
never present when the conflict issue was specifically addressed.
For these reasons, respondent's reliance on United States v. Woods,
544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1976) and United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d

1 (1st Cir. 1972), is misplaced.

In both of those cases, reference

is made to on-the-record discussion with the defendants to insure
that they were aware of the risks of multiple representation.

It

bears repeating that appellant Tippetts was never present during any
such inquiry.
In United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir., 1975),
the Fifth Circuit construed Faretta v. California, supra, to mean
that a defendant has a constitutional right to waive the effective
assistance of counsel and choose a lawyer serving conflicting interests.
In

reaching

this result, however, the Fifth Circuit analogized an

accused's waiver of his attorney's possible conflict of interest to the
procedural requirements associated with accepting a guilty plea:
. the . . . court should address each defendant
personally and forthrightly advise him of the
potential dangers of representation by counsel with
a conflict of interest. The defendant must be at
liberty to question the . . . court as to the
nature and consequences of his legal representation.
Most significantly, the court should seek to elicit
a narrative response from each defendant that he has
been advised of his right to effective representation,
that he understands the details of his attorney's
possible conflict of interest and the potential perils
of such a conflict, that he has discussed the matter
with his attorney or if he wishes with outside counsel,
and that he voluntarily waives his Sixth Amendment
protections.
. . . It is, of course, vital that the
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waiver be established by 'clear, unequivocal,
and unambiguous language. '
. Mere assent
in response to a series of questions from the
bench may in some circumstances constitute
an adequate waiver, but the court should nonetheless endeavor to have each defendant personally
articulate in detail his intent to forego this
significant constitutional protection. Recordation
of the waiver colloquy between defendant and judge
will also serve the government's interest by
assisting in shielding any potential conviction
from collateral attack, either on Sixth Amendment
grounds or on a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
'fundamental fairness' basis. 517 F.2d at 276.
Courts are beginning to increasingly recognize the intrica·
cies of obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of a complicated

right, such as the right to conflict-free counsel, by a lay person whc
lacks a lawyer's sophistication.

Thus, in the article cited by

respondent, "Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants:

Con-

flicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the
Defense Attorney", the commentator states:
A generalized admonition by the trial court that
counsel's duties to one client may conflict with
duties to another is hardly sufficient to supply
this knowledge, nor is the significance of potential conflicts likely to be understood. 62 Minn.
L. Rev. 119, 140-141.
Cognizant that some defendants may not be intelligently
capable of fully understanding the significance of conflicts, some
courts have declined to find a waiver despite explicit or implicit
consent to multiple representation.

In United States v. Bernstein,

533 F. 2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976), the Court found no waiver had been given
despite the defendant's consent to multiple representation.

And in

United States v. Gains, 529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976), the Court
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refused to find a waiver where the defendant had not been specifically
warned about the risks lurking in multiple representation.
~

The

court stated:
When the possiblity of a conflict appears during
trial, the court must investigate the relevant
facts, advise the defendant, and determine
whether continued representation, absent wavier,
would violate the sixth amendment.
529 F.2d
at 1043.
(Emphasis Supplied)
In this regard, it is worthy of note that the Supreme Court

in Glasser v. United States, supra, eschewed the Government's argument that Glasser had waived his Sixth Amendment rights.

In Glasser

the defendant's attorney, Stewart, was appointed to represent the
co-defendant, Kretske.

Glasser, an experienced trial lawyer who had

served for more than four years as a U. S. attorney prosecuting
criminal cases, objected and stated he preferred the individual
loyalty of his own attorney.

However, after an on-the-record dis-

cussion of the matter with all parties present, the Court appointed
Stewart to assume the defense of Kretske.

Glasser did not object

at that time.
In the instant case, appellant is not a veteran trial
lawyer.

He obviously lacked the knowledge of the need to preserve

objections for appellate review.

And unlike Glasser v. United States,

supra, the appellant was not present during a lengthy discussion
of the conflict problem.
Furthermore, respondent has misstated the holding of
Glasser v. United States, supra, when he states on page 6 of the
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brief:
The Supreme Court ruled that the conflict must
be "brought home to the court" by the party
who believes he is being denied effective
assistance of counsel.
Respondent interprets Glasser as thrusting an affirmative duty on
the defendant to convince the trial court that a conflict exists.
This is not the holding of Glasser; and the quoted language is
taken out of context.

The sentence, in its entirety, is

reprinted below, and appellant asserts that respondent's purported
holding cannot reasonably be inferred from the Court's language:
Of equal importance with the duty of the
court to see that an accused has the assistance
of counsel is its duty to refrain from
embarrassing counsel in the defense of an
accused by insisting, or indeed, even
suggesting, that counsel undertake to concurrently represent interests which might
diverge from those of his first client,
when the possibility of that divergence is
brought home to the court. 315 U.S. at 76.
POINT II
APPELLANT CONCEDES THAT HE DID NOT PERSONALLY
MAKE A TIMELY OBJECTION TO BEING REPRESENTED
BY AN ATTORNEY WITH DUAL LOYALTIES.
In response to Point III in respondent's brief, appellant
readily concedes that "he comes before the appellant court only now
waiving the banner of conflict of interest at this late date.
mention was made of such an objection at trial."
brief at 23).

No

(Respondent's

Respondent fails to understand that the absence of

a timely objection to the dual representation is entirely consistent
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with appellant's contention that the conflict hampered his attorney
and precluded him from receiving effective assistance of counsel.
Apparently respondent feels that despite the fact that the appellant
was never warned by either the trial court or his attorney of the
risks inherent in dual representation, he nonetheless should have
made a pro se objection to preserve the issue for appeal.
This argument is certainly paradoxical.

On the one hand,

we have case law which vigorously guards the accused's precious right
to counsel.

After decades of discussion, the Supreme Court in

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), put to rest the notion that
an accused can have a fair trial without a lawyer's assistance.
Justice Black's opinion for the Court reaffirmed Justice Sutherland's
now famous words from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932):
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right
to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of the law. If charged with a
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense, even though he has a perfect one.
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. If that be true of men
of intelligence how much more true is it of those
of feeble intellect. Id at 58.
But on the other hand, respondent argues that the appellant should
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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simultaneously be held responsible for evaluating the attorney's
tactics.

Thus, the respondent submits that the appellant must estab

lish by his own efforts the very things for whichthe Supreme Court
recognized he needed the assistance of counsel in the first place
and which he did not receive.

Appellant submits that this reasoning

is constitutionally infirm.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and the arguments previously
asserted in appellant's original brief, it is requested that the
judgment of the trial court be reversed and the appellant granted a
new trial.
DATED this

day of August, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.
Attorney for Appellant
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